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I. Introduction 
The following is an update on Louisiana’s legislative activity and case 
law relating to oil, gas, and mineral law, from August 1, 2016 to July 31, 
2017. 
                                                                                                                 
 * Rachel Cummings is an associate in The Woodlands office of Steptoe & 
Johnson PLLC. 
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II. Case Law 
A. Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine 
1. Guilbeau v. Hess Corporation1 
Kenneth Guilbeau (“Guilbeau”) purchased a tract of land in 2007 on 
which Hess Corporation’s (“Hess”) predecessors in title conducted oil and 
gas operations.2 The operations ended in 1971 with any leases affecting the 
property terminating in 1973.3 All oil and gas wells on the property were 
plugged and abandoned.4 When Guilbeau purchased the property, there was 
no assignment of rights to sue for “pre-purchase damages.”5 Guilbeau sued 
Hess for damages arising from contamination caused from the oil and gas 
operations that occurred on the property prior to when Guilbeau purchased 
the property.6  
The district court granted Hess’s motion for summary judgment.7 Hess 
argued that Louisiana law barred these claims based on the subsequent 
purchaser rule.8 The Louisiana Supreme Court analyzed the subsequent 
purchaser rule in depth in Eagle Pipe & Supply Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp. 
The court held that the subsequent purchaser rule is a rule in which a 
property owner has no standing to recover from a third party for damage 
that occurred on the property before he became the owner, unless there was 
an assignment of those rights from the owner of the property when the 
damage occurred thereto.9 Further, the court determined that damage to 
property is not a real right, but rather, a personal right to sue and does not 
automatically transfer to a subsequent purchaser.10 As such, Guilbeau had 
no right to sue Hess. 
Guilbeau argued that in its analysis, the Supreme Court of Louisiana did 
not address whether or not the subsequent purchase doctrine applied to 
mineral leases, which resulted in conflicting results in the appellate 
system.11 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that in the past, 
                                                                                                                 
. 1. Guilbeau v. Hess Corporation, 854 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2017).  
 2. Id. at 311.  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 312 (internal citation omitted). 
 10. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 11. Id. at 312-13. 
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the appellate courts differed on whether or not the subsequent purchaser 
rule applied to mineral leases and the Mineral Code, but that subsequent 
cases had arisen, showing agreement among the appellate courts that the 
subsequent purchase rule does indeed apply to mineral leases.12 The 
appellate court in this case did not see a reason to depart from the precedent 
established by the other appellate courts, and affirmed the district court’s 
decision, barring Guilbeau’s claim.13 
B. Prescription Periods and Clerical Errors 
1. Petro-Chem Operating Co., Inc. v. Flat River Farms, L.L.C.14 
In 1994, Max Hart, Jr. and Bernadette M. Hart (“Hart”) granted Flat 
River Farms, L.L.C. (“Flat River”) a three-fourths (3/4) interest in a 707-
acre tract, reserving the minerals (the “Hart Servitude”).15 The Harts 
executed an oil and gas lease with Spanoil Exploration, LLC on May 9, 
2001, which expired on May 9, 2004.16 The Hart Servitude was set to 
prescribe on March 3, 2004.17 Larry Lott of Lott Company, LLC (“Lott”) 
also owned a portion of the land that was subject to the Hart Servitude. 
Petro-Chem, the operator of the Swan Lake Prospect, of which the Hart 
Servitude was a part thereof, requested that Lott acquire CUA permits for 
two wells, one of which was burdened by the Hart Servitude.18 The permit 
was issued on January 20, 2004, and the well was spudded on March 28, 
2004.19 In 2008 Petro-Chem became aware that there was a possibility that 
the Hart Servitude had prescribed before any operations had commenced on 
the property.20 Petro-Chem filed suit in order to determine ownership of the 
mineral rights.21 Hart asked the trial court for a summary judgment holding 
that the Hart Servitude remained in full force and effect when the well was 
spudded due to certain events that would have extended the prescription 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Id. at 313-14. 
 13. Id. at 315. 
 14. Petro-Chem Operating Co., Inc. v. Flat River Farms, L.L.C., 51, 212-CA, 2017 WL 
786868 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/2017). 
 15. Id. at *1. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at *2. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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period.22 The trial court denied this motion and held in favor of those with 
competing claims.23 
Lott had also conveyed to Raymond J. Lasseigne (“Lasseigne”) a tract of 
land containing 63 acres.24 Jon G. Black, LLC (“Black”) wanted to buy the 
tract and hired a titled company to investigate the tract.25 The title company 
found a defect from the sale from Lott to Lasseigne. Lott and Lasseigne 
attempted to correct the defect by exchanging the 63-acre tract with another 
piece of property that Lott owned in section 11 through an act of 
exchange.26 Lott then sold the 63-acre tract to Black. During the act of 
exchange, there was no reservation of the mineral rights; however, when 
Lott then conveyed the 63-acre tract to Black, Lott reserved the minerals.27 
Lott did not reserve the mineral rights in the second tract to Lasseigne.28 
After the acts of exchange and deeds were recorded, the notary filed two 
notarial affidavits of correction.29 The first affidavit was regarding the act 
of exchange, and stated that it was Lott’s intention to reserve the mineral 
rights in the tract located in section 11, and the second was to correct the 
deed to Black, which stated that it was not the intent of Lott to reserve the 
mineral rights in the 63-acre tract.30 Lott subsequently conveyed all mineral 
rights owned by Lott in the 63-acre tract and section 11 tract which left 
Lasseigne with only ownership of the surface rights in the subsequent 
tract.31 Lasseigne filed a motion for summary judgment asking that the 
affidavit of correction related to the act of exchange be stricken from the 
conveyance records and be declared invalid.32 The trial court granted 
Lasseigne summary judgment stating that an affidavit of correction may 
only be used to amend clerical errors.33 
Hart argued that the trial court erred when granting the competing 
mineral complainant’s summary judgment regarding the prescription of the 
mineral servitude.34 She asserted that there were multiple obstacles that 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at *3. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at *4. 
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would have suspended the prescription period because it prevented a well 
from being spudded prior to March 3, 2004, including the fact that the 
USDA easement prevented timely exercise of the servitude, as well as 
inclement weather, and inaccessibility of the area where the well was 
intended to be spudded.35 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with 
the trial court and found that Petro-Chem was familiar with the prospect 
area and the challenges associated with drilling in the area.36 The appellate 
court also found that the failure to timely exercise the use of the servitude 
was solely due to Petro-Chem’s failure to plan properly, rather than to 
circumstances Petro-Chem could not control.37 
Furthermore, Black argued that the trial court erred when it interpreted 
the notarial correction was not a clerical error.38 According to the appellate 
court, a clerical error cannot correct a substantive error or amend 
substantive terms of a contract, but rather can only correct minor 
mistakes.39  The court found that the addition of language amending a 
reservation of mineral rights is a substantive change, which would change 
the intent of the document, and therefore, is not a clerical error.40  
C. Unit Operator Reports 
1. TDX Energy LLC v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc.41  
The Louisiana Office of Conservation created the HA RA SUH unit on 
September 29, 2008, to be effective on September 16, 2008.42 Chesapeake 
was named the operator of the unit, then a well was spudded on February 5, 
201l and completed on July 19, 2011.43 Touchstone Energy LLC obtained 
multiple oil and gas leases covering approximately 63 net acres located in 
the unit, which were subsequently assigned to TDX.44 TDX notified 
Chesapeake that it had acquired an interest in the well holding the unit and 
asked Chesapeake to provide a report in accordance with La. R.S. 30:103.1 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at *5. 
 37. Id. at *6. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at *7. 
 40. Id. 
 41. TDX Energy, LLC v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., No. 12-1242, 2016 WL 1179206 
(W.D. La. Mar. 24, 2016). 
 42. Id. at *3. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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of its operating costs for the well.45 TDX followed up a month later stating 
that Chesapeake did not comply with La. R.S. 30:103.1.46 Less than a week 
later, Chesapeake provided TDX with a list of its costs and explained that, 
pursuant to La. R.S. 30:10, TDX had thirty (30) days from the date of 
notice to elect to participate in the well and that failure to provide notice 
would automatically be deemed an election not to participate in the well.47 
TDX responded a month later stating that Chesapeake had forfeited any 
right to demand contribution from TDX for well costs because it did not 
comply with La. R.S. 30:103.1.48 
Chesapeake argued that TDX is not entitled to anything under La. R.S. 
30:103.1 and La. R.S. 30:103.2 because it is not the owner of any unleased 
oil and gas interest, and as such, Chesapeake has no obligation to give TDX 
well information.49 TDX argues that “owner or owners of unleased oil and 
gas interests” refers to the owner of the oil and gas interests within the unit 
that are unleased by the operator of the unit, which would be Chesapeake.50 
The district court found that the statutes read by themselves appear to refer 
to oil and gas interests that are not leased, rather than not leased by the 
operator.51 Further, the district court found that Chesapeake was entitled to 
recover, under La. R.S. 30:10, TDX’s allocated share of reasonable 
expenditures.52 However, the court disagreed that TDX was responsible for 
a risk charge that was equal to 200% of TDX’s allocated share of the cost 
of the unit well.53 The court agreed with TDX that a risk charge was not 
applicable to their share of the cost of the well because Chesapeake did not 
send notice that they were drilling or intended to drill a well prior to when 
the well was complete.54 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals took up the case on May 12, 2017 
and partially reversed and affirmed the district court’s decision.55 The 
appellate court reversed the district court’s summary judgment grant in 
favor of Chesapeake regarding the drilling and operating costs, finding that 
TDX, as a lessee, had the same rights as the owner of a tract when it comes 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at *5. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at *8. 
 53. Id. at *10. 
 54. Id. 
 55. TDX Energy, LLC v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 857 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2017).  
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to the reporting requirements of La. R.S. 30:103.1.56 In its reasoning, the 
court looked at the natural reading of La. R.S. 30:103.1 and La. R.S. 
30:103.2. They found that operators gave up their right to any contribution 
from a lessee when they failed to timely report to those lessees with 
interests in the land where the operator has no lease.57  Non-operators lack 
any access to the data of a well drilled within a unit, and these statutes 
allow lessees a manner in which to gain access to that information.58 
The appellate court also affirmed the grant of summary judgment for 
TDX and denied Chesapeake its counterclaim for any risk charges. The 
district court found that Chesapeake was not entitled to the risk fee since 
the statute was clear that it affected owners drilling or intending to drill, 
requiring those owners to notify the other owners of the drilling or the 
intent to drill.59 Chesapeake argued that TDX had exploited a loophole in 
the statute by not recording their leases until after the unit well had been 
completed.60 The court acknowledged that the current version of La. R.S. 
30:10 fixed this problem by adding language that would allow Chesapeake 
to send notice to owners after it had drilled a unit well.61 However, at the 
time these events occurred, Chesapeake was only required to notify if it was 
currently drilling or intended to drill the unit well.62 
2. XXI Oil & Gas v. Hilcorp II63 
In 2011, the Trahan No. 1 drilling unit was created by the Louisiana 
Commissioner of Conservation.64 Hilcorp recompleted the well, which 
began producing on January 11, 2011.65 XXI began leasing the lands 
covered by the drilling unit in February of 2011.66 XXI sued Hilcorp for not 
complying with La. R.S. 30:103.1, which provides that an operator or 
producer of oil and gas units shall provide reports detailing costs associated 
with wells to owners of “unleased oil and gas interests” when the producer 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. at 260-63. 
 57. Id. at 262. 
 58. Id. at 263. 
 59. Id. at 266. 
 60. Id. at 267. 
 61. Id. at 266. 
 62. Id. at 267. 
 63. XXI Oil & Gas, LLC v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 206 So.3d 885 (La. App. 3 Cir. 
9/28/2016), reh’g denied (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/9/16), writ denied 216 So.3d 814 (La. 2017). 
 64. Id. at 887. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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has no valid oil, gas, or mineral lease.67 If this statute is not complied with, 
then the operator has no right to ask the other owner to contribute to the 
costs for the well.68  The trial court granted partial summary judgment 
against Hilcorp, finding that Hilcorp violated La. R.S. 30:103.1 by not 
providing a sworn, itemized statement of costs to XXI as an interest 
owner.69 Hilcorp argued that La. R.S. 30:103.1 and 30:103.2 do not apply 
to mineral lessees, and therefore, XXI had no claim against Hilcorp.70 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana agreed with the trial 
court holding that the statement sent to XXI was not sworn and 
consequently, Hilcorp was liable for $367,231.30 to XXI, which Hilcorp 
appealed.71 Hilcorp again argued that the statutes refer only to “oil and gas 
interests that are not leased at all as opposed to not leased by the 
operator.”72 However, the Third Circuit upheld its opinion that if an 
operator of a well has no valid lease on the land, a lessee who is not the 
operator or producer of the well has a right to demand a statement of costs 
pursuant to La. R.S. 30:103.73 
D.  Pipeline Servitudes 
1. Enterprise TE Products Pipeline v. Avila74 
Enterprise TE Products Pipeline Company, LLC (“Enterprise”) wanted 
to expropriate a thirty-foot-wide servitude over a tract of land in St. Martin 
Parish.75 The trial court awarded the servitude, but made it subject to a term 
of ninety-nine years, and awarded the twelve landowners a total value of 
$1,300.00.76 The named landowners were each awarded between $150.00 
and $300.00, even though their total interest in the property amounted only 
to 1.1983418%.77 Enterprise appealed the judgment citing two errors, that 
the trial court imposed a term on the servitude, which creates a 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. at 890. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 887-88. 
 70. Id. at 888. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Enter. Te Prods. Pipeline Co., LLC v. Avila, 16-207, 2016 WL 6495978 (La. App. 3 
Cir. 11/2/16). 
 75. Id. at *1. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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conventional or contractual servitude, rather than a legal servitude, and that 
the compensation amount was contrary to the trial court’s findings.78 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that a pipeline servitude is a 
legal servitude, rather than a natural or conventional servitude.79 A legal 
servitude is a “[limitation] on ownership established by law for the benefit 
of the general public or for the benefit of particular persons.”80 Further, the 
court found that a pipeline servitude was a permanent servitude and that 
there was no case history which awarded a permanent servitude a limited 
term.81 The appellate court found that the trial court erred when fixing any 
term on the servitude.82 
The appellate court also found that the trial court erred in the amount of 
the compensation award to the landowners.83 According to Louisiana 
Revised Statutes 19:9, the value of property that is expropriated is the value 
that the property had before any type of improvement was proposed, 
“without deducting the general or specific benefits from the proposed 
improvements or work.”84 An expert for Enterprise found that total value of 
the servitude was $1,300.00.85 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found 
that when the trial court awarded the compensation, they took into account 
the effect that this expropriation would have “upon the ancestors of an 
African-American landowner who acquired the property at a time when 
ownership by a person of color was rare.”86 The appellate court awarded the 
named landowners an amount between $0.33 and $5.23.87 
E. Royalties Prior to Unitization 
1. Gladney v. Anglo-Dutch Energy88 
Frank Hayes Gladney and Margaret Stella Gladney Guidroz granted 
Anglo-Dutch Energy, L.L.C. and Anglo-Dutch (Everest), L.L.C. a lease 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 645). 
 81. Id. at *2.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at *3. 
 84. Id. at *2 (quoting LA. R.S. 19:9). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at *3. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Gladney v. Anglo-Dutch Energy, L.L.C., 210 So. 3d 903 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/21/16), 
reh’g denied (La. App. 3 Cir. 1/25/17), writ denied 218 So.3d 120 (La. 2017). 
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over its land in August of 2009.89 The lease provided for a 1/5 royalty, and 
a well was drilled and completed on the lessors’ property on April 27, 
2012.90 The land on which the well was drilled was owned by multiple 
landowners, and on May 11, 2012, Anglo-Dutch filed a pre-application 
notice with the Louisiana Office of Conservation, asking for a compulsory 
drilling and production unit for said well.91 Once an application has been 
filed for a unit, the operator is allowed a conditional allowable, which 
allows the operator to “extract a specific volume of production from a 
reservoir prior to the establishment of a unit.”92 The conditional allowable 
was granted on May 17, 2012, which stated the following: 
All monies generated from the date of first production, the 
disbursement of which is contingent upon the outcome of the 
current proceedings before the Office of Conservation for the 
Frio Zone will be disbursed based upon results of those 
proceedings.93 
Anglo-Dutch submitted its formal application for the unit on July 3, 
2012.94 On October 30, 2012 a public hearing was held and Anglo-Dutch 
completed the legal publication of notice for the unit.95 An order for the 
unit was issued on January 23, 2013, stating that the unit will be effective 
on and after October 30, 2012.96  
The lessors made demands for non-payment of royalties and argued that 
Anglo-Dutch was obligated to pay the full 20% royalty for production prior 
to October 30, 2012, the date of the effective unit.97 Anglo-Dutch argued 
that they were only liable for payment of royalties based on the lessor’s unit 
basis interests due to the issuance of the conditional allowable.98  
The trial court ruled in favor of Anglo-Dutch stating that the allowable 
covered the royalty payments and that the lessors did not show where in the 
lease it would require Anglo-Dutch to pay the full royalty when a 
conditional allowable had been granted.99  
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. at 904. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 904-05. 
 92. Id. at 905. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 906. 
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The Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the trial 
court’s ruling, and ultimately found that Gladney was entitled to their full 
1/5 lease basis royalty from the date of first production to the effective date 
of unitization.100 The court found that the lease was clear that the plaintiffs 
were to receive lease-basis royalties on production prior to the unitization 
order.101 Since the unitization order specifically stated that it was effective 
October 30, 2012, full royalties were due to the lessors for production prior 
to that date.102 The court agreed with the lessors that the Office of 
Conservation cannot impede private contract rights, and further, according 
to an affidavit from an Office of Conservation representative, a conditional 
allowable was not meant to “affect in any manner the private contractual 
obligations of an operator or lessee.”103 The court found that Anglo-Dutch 
could modify the obligation under the lease via a royalty escrow agreement, 
which the lessors were amenable to; however, Anglo-Dutch did elect to 
enter into such agreement, and was therefore liable for the full royalty 
payment to the plaintiffs.104 
F. Solidarily Liability 
1. Gloria’s Ranch, LLC v. Tauren Exploration, Inc.105 
Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. (“Gloria’s Ranch) and Tauren Exploration, Inc. 
(“Tauren”) entered into an oil and gas lease dated September 17, 2004, 
covering approximately 1,390 acres for a primary term of three years.106 
The lease covered all formations and included a vertical and horizontal 
Pugh clause.107 In 2006, Tauren assigned 49% of its interest in the lease to 
Cubic Energy, Inc. (“Cubic”)108 In March of 2007, Tauren and Cubic 
entered into a credit agreement with Wells Fargo Energy Capital, Inc. 
(“Wells Fargo”) and used its interest in the subject lease as collateral.109 
Multiple wells were drilled on the property to the Cotton Valley 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at 907-10. 
 101. Id. at 907. 
 102. Id. at 909. 
 103. Id. at 908. 
 104. Id. at 910. 
 105. Gloria’s Ranch, LLC v. Tauren Expl., Inc., 51,077, 2017 WL 2391927 (La. App. 2 
Cir. 6/2/17). 
 106. Id. at *1. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at *2. 
 109. Id. 
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formation.110 While the lease was still in its primary term, Chesapeake 
Operating, Inc. had completed wells in the Cotton Valley formation in 
sections of land that were unitized with the subject land, which was later 
unitized in the Soaring Ridge 15-15-15H unit that was drilled into the 
Haynesville Shale formation.111 In 2009, Gloria’s Ranch and Chesapeake 
entered into a top lease to cover Chesapeake’s operations in Section 21.112 
Subsequently, Tauren assigned unto EXCO USA Asset, Inc. (“EXCO”) 
51% of its interest in Gloria’s Ranch’s lease in depths below the base of the 
Cotton Valley formation.113 Wells Fargo released Tauren’s interest from the 
mortgage and in return, received a net profits interest in the shallow rights 
and an overriding in the deep rights.114 
Gloria’s Ranch sent a letter to Tauren, Cubic, EXCO, and Wells Fargo 
asking for information on the revenue and expenses of the wells on the 
lease because they believed that the lease had expired for not producing in 
paying quantities.115 Tauren responded to their letter, determining that the 
lease was producing profitably.116 Gloria’s Ranch responded by asking for a 
recorded release of the lease, which did not occur.117 The trial court found 
that the lease had indeed expired in depths below the Cotton Valley Sand, 
and expired in as to all depths in Sections 9, 10, 16, and 21 since there was 
no producing in paying quantities on those wells.118 
 Tauren argued that the trial court was incorrect as to the expiration of 
the lease as to Sections 9, 10, 16, and 21 for failure of the wells drilled 
thereon to produce in paying quantities.119 Gloria’s Ranch had requested 
accounting information from the defendants.120 Their suspicions were 
raised when the production volumes that were reported to the Louisiana 
Department of Conservation appeared to be too little to constitute paying 
quantities.121 Tauren provided operating statements of three wells, but 
Gloria’s Ranch had discovered that these statements were amended to make 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Id. at *2-3. 
 111. Id. at *3. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at *4. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at *5. 
 119. Id. at *8. 
 120. Id. at *9. 
 121. Id. 
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the wells appear more profitable than they actually were.122 The statements 
provided by Tauren excluded administrative charges, ad valorem taxes, 
contract labor costs, and routine chemical charges.123 Experts testified that 
these were typical charges that are deducted from the profitability of a 
well.124  Tauren argued that despite the wells not being profitable, they 
maintained the lease due to an “ongoing business plan to develop the 
Haynesville Shale formation.”125 The appellate court determined that this 
was not enough to perpetuate the terms of the lease and affirmed the trial 
court’s decision that the lease had expired as to Sections 9, 10, 16, and 
21.126 
Wells Fargo and Tauren challenged the trial court’s holding that found 
them solidarily liable along with the other defendants for damages.127 The 
court found that under La. R.S. 31:207, if an owner of a mineral right does 
not furnish a lessor with a recordable act showing that a lease has expired 
within 30 days of receiving a written demand from the lessor, then that 
owner is liable for all damages and reasonable attorney fees.128 Tauren 
argues that since it was only an owner in the shallow rights, it should be 
held responsible for damages relating solely to those rights.129 The court 
refuted that argument by citing La. R.S. 31:168, which states that 
ownership of a mineral right is indivisible and so an obligation to produce a 
recordable release was also indivisible.130 As such, Tauren was solidarily 
liable.131 
The trial court found that Wells Fargo was solidarily liable because the 
mortgage on Cubic’s interest contained an assignment of the lease, the 
mortgage stated that the lease could not be released without prior consent 
from Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo had an override and a net profits interest in 
the lease, and it received cost information from the other defendants.132 
Wells Fargo argued that it did not receive an assignment of the lease, but 
rather a security interest.133 The appellate court agreed with Wells Fargo 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at *10. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at *12. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at *22. 
 128. Id. at *24. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at *25. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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arguing that because the mortgage did not include an assignment of Cubic’s 
working interest, it was not an assignment of the lease.134 The sole purpose 
of the “assignment” language was to secure the loan by granting a security 
interest in the leases.135 However, the court found that Wells Fargo did in 
fact have some control over Cubic’s working interest as the mortgage 
granted Wells Fargo the right to approve location and depth of wells and 
the right to access the property at all times.136 Further, Wells Fargo had to 
give written consent for any new operating agreements and amendments 
and written consent to release the lease.137 The court found that Wells Fargo 
had actually specifically denied the release of the lease.138 As a result, the 
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Wells Fargo was 
solitarily liable for damages.139  
III. Statutes 
A. Risk Fee Statute 
Act No. 524 amends La. R.S. 30:10.140 In its original state, La. R.S. 
30:10, also known as the Risk Fee Statute, required notices to be sent to 
other owners in the unit from an owner who was drilling or intended to drill 
a unit well, a substitute unit well, an alternate unit well, or a cross-unit well 
on a drilling unit.141 The 2016 amendment closed a loophole in the statute 
that TDX Energy, LLC v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc. pointed out. The 
court in TDX recognized that a free-rider problem could potentially occur if 
a non-operator decided to wait until the well was drilled before obtaining an 
interest in the unit through recording its leases. Act No. 524 adds language 
that allows an operator to give notice to other owners after a well has been 
completed.142 
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